Collective Action: Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station and Nova Kakhovka Dam

Ask: What new, perhaps non-obvious proactive approaches can be taken to try to reverse weaponization of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station and Ukraine’s hemispherically important Nova Kakhovka Dam by Russia?

Fact: The Putin regime’s state terrorist activities against the Nova Kakhovka Dam and Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station are a threat to world food supply, and specifically to developing Africa.

Approach: Ukraine and all friendly nations standing by its side should confer and collaborate to:

1. Engage a diplomatic full court press to persuade African nations to pull together in collective security to pressure China to verifiably, with no surreptitious exceptions, use all influence channels to cut-off international aid and economic support to Russia while Putin’s regime engages in nuclear-radiation terrorism at Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station, and at the Nova Kakhovka Dam it blew up, the repair and remediation of which it continues to disrupt by its unnecessary war of aggression in Ukraine. Also, African nations should pressure China to influence an end to Russia’s destabilizing activities in Africa by the Wagner Group. Acts of terrorist bombing have or will have a disproportionate negative impact on African nations’ food supplies, security, harmony, and will add painful destabilization pressure on African peoples and governments that threaten to trigger pressure points for famine, refugee crises, and wars. African governments’ leverage should be their freedom to switch over to Western business partners in proceeding with infrastructure development, ceasing indefinitely further BRI activities in Africa, and ejecting Wagner Group from Africa. When African nations act collectively, it can help prevent crises from merely being moved around, externally caused, or reseeded in easily provoked retaliatory cycles.
2. Multilaterally agree among signing nations to employ applicable provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (UNCSTB) to interdict war-making supplies, contraband, stolen goods, conflict minerals, weapons, money, and things of value bound for or credited to Russia with which it may continue its war on Ukraine and terrorist acts under cover of illegitimate warfare. Convention states should take combined, measured military action against suppliers, commandeer supplies for Ukrainian use, and challenge the Russian aggression against Ukraine as failing to fall within the meaning of War as opposed to terrorist action under the UNCSTB by its own terms, and in view of Russia’s UN Security council veto rendering irrelevant enforcement of the Law of War as to Russia, the resulting fictional applicability of which is used in bad faith to justify non-application of the UNCSTB;
3. Take repeated, collective action among all nations supporting Ukraine to diplomatically persuade more nations to get behind a United Nations Emergency Assembly to initiate or further a process for removing Russia from the U.N. Security Council based on Moscow’s actions of nuclear radiation terrorism, food supply terrorism, and for political coercion using terrorism against civilian infrastructure in Ukraine that reach beyond Ukraine with fallout.

These core actions will produce results which themselves will build more leverage for positive reversal of irresponsible terrorist activity by Russia and obvious terror sponsorship by Russia’s enablers in its war on Ukraine.